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TRADE UNIONS AND THE WAGES FUND
THEORY: ON THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF MILL’S RECANTATION
AND SOME NOTES ON MARX’S
THEORETICAL INTERVENTION
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and
George Economakis*
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Department of  Business Administration
The intensity of  class struggle in England of  1860s began to transform trade unions
from mutual aid association societies to key factors in wage bargaining. These
changes at the political level undoubtedly triggered corresponding shifts in theoreti-
cal discussion of  wages. These shifts had to do chiefly with the recognition of  the ca-
pacity of  the trade unions to impose permanent increases in real wages without caus-
ing unemployment. Our analysis will focus on the theoretical interventions of  J. S.
Mill and K. Marx in this historic conjuncture. They both implicitly challenged the
dominant analytical consensus in accordance with which every labour confrontation
was ultimately detrimental to the working class’s own interests. Revising his own
previous arguments, Mill came to support a reformist strategy which made room for
trade unions but in the final analysis did not dispute capitalist rule. Marx, by contrast,
challenged such political projects, stressing the irreconcilable contradiction between
the long-run class interests of  capital and labour.
1. Introduction
he upturn in the workers’ movement in Britain in the 1860s con-
tributed to a proliferation of  trade-union organizations and led
 ultimately to legalization of  trade-union activity. The social role of  the
trade unions appears to have undergone gradual transformation: from
organizations for mutual assistance they began to evolve into significant
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factors in bargaining (Breit 1967, 513; Hobsbawm 1996 [1975], 113-114;
Schumpeter 1994 [1954], 759-760; Biagini 1987).
These changes at the political level had important repercussions for
theoretical discussion on wages. Worth a specific mention is the fact
that during the 1860s two different political strategies developed within
the workers’ movement, represented – arguably – at the theoretical level
by the interventions of  Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill (henceforth
‘Mill’). The present paper seeks first and foremost, with the two above-
mentioned writers (in no way fortuitously) as a basic point of  reference,
to explore the terrain underlying the shifts in the theoretical discussion.
These interventions (among others, obviously) constitute a break
with the dominant ideological consensus against trade union action.
According to this consensus every demand by workers is seen as in the
final analysis contrary to the interests of  the working class itself. There
were two basic arguments to support such a perspective. In accordance
with the first, which emerges (though not without qualification) from
within the work of  Ricardo himself, every increase in real wages above
the level of  subsistence tends to be nullified by a corresponding increase
in population. From this viewpoint trade union activity appears – to say
the least – ineffectual. The second argument was linked to the ‘rigid’ or
‘vulgar’ version of  the wages fund theory, which portrayed the materi-
al fund of  the commodity wages as prima facie invariable or inflexible as
against workers’ demands.
In his Principles, despite having partially rejected the rigid variant of
the wages fund theory, Mill was explicitly negative in his attitude to-
wards any claim-oriented activity of  trade unions. Traces of  the anti-
syndicalist argumentation employed at an earlier date by Ricardo do in-
deed survive in his work. Though the wages fund was treated as
modifiable (particularly if  allowance were made for state mediation), he
himself  basically believed that trade union demands would lead not to
an increase but to a reduction in individual wages. It was precisely this
point that he felt obliged to reassess in his ‘recantation’ of  1869. In con-
trast to what is usually claimed in the relevant secondary literature, this
shift in Mill’s views definitely had theoretical content and motivation. As
befitted the new political conjuncture, there was clear acknowledge-
ment of  a bargaining role for trade unions. For the first time a reformist
trade union strategy was openly advocated which nevertheless, in the fi-
nal analysis, did not go so far as to challenge capitalist power.
Marx, on the other hand, as leading figure within the First Interna-
tional, was not content merely to demonstrate the capacity of  trade
unions to secure income redistribution. Emphasising the irreconcilable
character of  the conflict between the long-run class interests of  capital
and labour, he considered that in the particular historical circumstances
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the trade unions should also function as organizational centres of  the
workers’ political struggle against capitalist political power.
The present paper is structured as follows. In section two we under-
take a critical mapping of  basic theses of  Classical Political Economy,
starting from Ricardo’s wages theory and focusing specifically on Mill’s
wages fund theory. In section three we investigate the reasons for the
sudden change of  climate vis-à-vis the wages fund theory, with special
emphasis on Mill’s famous recantation. In section four we examine
Marx’s related intervention at this conjuncture, in particular his theo-
retical critique of  the anti-syndicalist theories of  the classical school. In
the epilogue we shall summarize our conclusions.
2. From Ricardian Theory of Wages to Wages Fund Theory:
The Classical ‘Reaction’ Against Trade Unionism
2. 1. Questions on the Ricardian Theory of  Wages
According to Ricardo (1984 [1817], 52) «[l]abour […] has its natural and
its market price». While the natural price of  labour is «that price which
is necessary to enable the labourers, one with another to subsist and to
perpetuate their race, without either increase or diminution […] [t]he
market price of  labour is the price which is really paid for it, from the
natural operation of  the proportion of  the supply to the demand;
labour is dear when it is scarce and cheap when it is plentiful» (ibidem,
52-53). The supply of  labour depends on the magnitude of  the popula-
tion, its growth rate being determined by a (Malthusian) population
principle. Demand for labour is in turn a factor of  capital accumulation.
It is, in other words, dependent on the rate of  capital growth. The nat-
ural price of  labour is the (long-run) centre of  gravity in labour pricing,
ensuring stability of  population.1 The short-run market price oscillates
around it, tending always to conform to it (see Ricardo, ibidem, 53).
In the process of  capitalist development or, as Ricardo expresses it,
«[i]n the natural advance of  society»,2 «the wages of  labour will have a
tendency to fall».
As population increases, these necessaries [the commodities on which the wages are
expended] will be constantly rising in price, because more labour will be necessary
to produce them [due to diminishing returns of  the soil]. If  then the money wages
of  labour should fall, whilst every commodity on which the wages of  labour were
expended rose, the labourer would be doubly affected, and would be soon totally de-
1 According to Rowthorn 1984 [1980], 185, in Ricardo’s schema «[w]hen wages are exactly
at the natural level, the population is stationary and the workforce is just replaced from one
generation to the next».
2 Nature advance of  society, which leads it (in the «longer run») to the «stationary state» (see
Rowthorn 1984 [1980], 188 ff.).
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prived of  subsistence. Instead, therefore, of  the money wages of  labour falling, they
would rise; but they would not rise sufficiently to enable the labourer to purchase as
many comforts and necessaries as he did before the rise in the price of  those com-
modities.
(ibidem, 57)
Many points of  Ricardo theses on wages are theoretically vague. The
following is a brief  review of  some of  them.
One preliminary question has to do with the content of  the natural
price of  labour. Is it «a physiological minimum» or «a cultural minimum»
(Rubin 1989 [1929], 280 ff.)? In other words, what is the content of  Ri-
cardo’s «subsistence wage assumption»? (Hollander 1983, 314 ff.). Is the
reference to a subsistence level biological or cultural? Ricardo (1984 [1817],
54-55) writes in this connection: «It is not to be understood that the nat-
ural price of  labour, estimated even in food and necessaries, is ab-
solutely fixed and constant. It varies at different times in the same coun-
try, and very materially differs in different countries. It essentially
depends on the habits of  the people». The long-run real price of  labour
(i.e. the natural price of  labour) is thus determined by the cultural status of
the different stages in the development of  a society or country and of
different societies or countries (the habits of  people at different times
and places). What Ricardo is suggesting here is an extra-economic or ex-
ogenous determination of  natural real wages, i.e. a determination inde-
pendent of  purely economic factors (or variables).1
If  Ricardo’s reference is to a cultural minimum, i.e. a cultural subsis-
tence level, one issue to be clarified is how the (Malthusian) principle
 exerts its influence on population, or in other words on the supply of
labour?
One possible answer is that the (Malthusian) population principle it-
self includes a cultural element. According to Stigler (1956, 190),
«Malthus is reasonably clear that usually it [the level of  subsistence of
the masses] is a cultural minimum, well above the biological mini-
mum». Ricardo (1984 [1817], 55, 57) was aware of  this dimension of  the
«law» of  population when he wrote: «An English labourer would con-
sider his wages under their natural rate, and too scanty to support a
family, if  they enable him to purchase no other food than potatoes, and
to live in no better habitation than a mud cabin […]. The friends of  hu-
manity cannot but wish that in all countries the labouring classes should
have a taste for comforts and enjoyments, and that they should be stim-
1 This point has been made in the relevant secondary literature, e.g. see Garegnani 1983,
1984; Bharadwaj 1978. According to characteristic comment by Harcourt 1972, 2, the theo-
ry of  distribution in classical fashion, in the tradition especially of  Ricardo, precedes in context
and priority the theory of  value. On the theoretical subject of  internal-external (economic) de-
terminations see also Mandel 1980.
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ulated by all legal means in their exertions to produce them. There can-
not be a better security against a superabundant population».
But how could this notion of  a cultural minimum for the wages of
labour be reconciled with the Ricardian thesis of  real wages falling (de-
terioration of  the standards of  labourers’ living) in the course of  capi-
talist development as population increases and «land of  an inferior qual-
ity, or less advantageously situated, is called into cultivation» (ibidem,
35)? Our view is that a theoretical question definitely arises here, be-
cause if  the natural price of  labour is governed by a cultural minimum
and the population principle incorporates a cultural element, the natu-
ral price of  labour will not be regulated by the size of  population but
will in fact regulate it.
According to Rubin (1989 [1929], 279, 281, 283) Ricardo «usually forgets
these qualifications» (of  cultural factors qualifying the physiological el-
ement), tending in fact to persist with the suggestion of  a physiological
minimum (functioning as an «iron law»),1 by virtue of  which the (real)
wages of  labour have the tendency in the longer run (that is in the
process of  capitalist development or in its stationary state) to be held
down to a physiological minimum. In this way, real wages are ultimate-
ly an «outcome» of  the internal logic of  a cohesive system grounded «in
the workings of  natural laws: the ‘physico-chemical’ law of  diminishing
fertility of  the soil, and the ‘biological’ law of  population», i.e. the vulgar
biological aspect of  the population principle (also see Mandel 1971).2
Be that as it may, Ricardo’s theoretical schema for the wages of  labour
incorporates two theoretical notions of  the natural real price of  labour,
namely the one positing a cultural minimum (long run period) and the
one positing a physiological minimum (longer run period).3 The former
makes cautious overtures to class struggle as being among the factors de-
termining wage levels in the long run (establishing a cultural minimum).
It introduces class struggle – Ricardo gave qualified acceptance to such
conceptions – to the extent of  assigning it a role among the extra-eco-
nomic (cultural) determinations of  natural real wages, prescribing a cul-
tural minimum and transforming it into a political minimum, which in
turn exercises a determinate influence on people’s habits. The popula-
1 The proposition that «wages would be forced down to their physiological minimum […]
was later popularized by Ferdinand Lassalle as the notorious ‘iron law of  wages’» (Rowthorn
1984 [1980], 194).
2 The overall Ricardian conception of  the process of  the capitalist development («natural
tendency of  profits to fall» – arrest of  «all accumulation» of  capital – and the terminal station-
ary state) is actually based on these natural laws (Ricardo 1984 [1817], 64 ff.; see also Rubin 1989
[1929], 279 ff.).
3 We agree with Rowthorn 1984 [1980], 189-191 that Ricardo’s theoretical schema could
stand without the assumptions that confine his theory to a «rigidly fixed […] unchanging sub-
sistence minimum». We do not however intend to review the validity of  this argument in the
present paper.
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tion principle here functions as a means for preserving the long-term
equilibrium of natural real wages, which thus become an exogenously
predefined cultural-political centre of  gravity. This makes it possible for
there to be different long-term levels of  the natural price of  labour as a
result of  the correlations of  power between capital and labour.1
From the outset Ricardo’s second theoretical conception totally pre-
cludes the possibility of  class struggle determining the wages of  labour
(the physiological minimum). Workers’ real wages in the longer run are
determined from within a closed system as an exclusive outcome of  the
action of  autonomous variables, impenetrable to class struggle: natural
laws. Any practice benefiting workers (such as trade union organiza-
tion), any legislation favouring the labouring class, is futile, simply be-
cause the population principle (in its strictly biological manifestations)
ensures imposition of  a biologically determined center of  gravity of
labour price, unaffected by class struggle2 (also see Rubin 1989 [1929],
280-282). Ricardo (1984 [1817], 61) writes:
These, then, are the laws by which wages are regulated, and by which the happiness
of  far the greatest part of  every community is governed. Like all other contracts,
1 According to Stirati 1994, 50 ff., 81 ff., 147 ff., the possibility of  the existence of  different
natural wages also emerges from Smithian analysis. This is a case «of  persistent changes in pro-
portion between the demand for labour and the population, which Smith associates with dif-
ferent trends of  the economy: whether it is stationary, declining, or growing rapidly. In this case
changes in that proportion are linked with structural aspects of  the economic system» which
«have a non-transitory influence on the bargaining position of  the workers» and «will affect
[thus] the natural wage». In a situation of  rapid economic growth, real wages rise to levels
above those of  biological subsistence (Smith 1981 [1776], i.viii.16-17, 22-23 – also see Stirati, ibi-
dem). In Smith’s theoretical schema «the natural wage is a center of  gravitation […] while sub-
sistence consumption represents the minimum level for the natural wage at a given time and
place» (Stirati, ibidem, 83). On the basis of  the Smithian theory of  wages, Stirati (ibidem, 149
ff.) goes on to propose a very interesting «translation of  Ricardo theory into Smith’s terminol-
ogy» in the framework of  which she employs Ricardian analysis to deduce different long-run
natural wages. According then to this «translation» from a (previous) natural wage to the real
market wage could be a lasting «deviation» which «is caused by a changed proportion between
population» (that is the supply of  labour) «and the demand for labour. […] [T]his cause of  wage
variation has a certain persistence because of  the slowness and uncertainty of  the population
adjustment mechanisms which […] must intervene to correct the imbalance between em-
ployment and population». These «lasting changes in supply/demand ratio» thus lead in the
long run «to changes in the natural wage» (see ibidem, 150-151).
2 Before and during these «early phases» of  the industrial revolution (i.e. at the time that Ri-
cardo was writing his works) «organised unions hardly […] existed in the trades» (Hobsbawm
1952, 59). Contradictory pictures of  the labour movement («desperate revolt and retreat, so fa-
miliar from 1815-1848»: ibidem, 57) permeate Ricardo’s writings and are crystallized in the vari-
ety of  ways he apprehends the mode of  formation of  workers’ wages. Realizing the hopeless-
ness of  labour resistance to the masters’ objective of  reducing wages to starvation level,
Ricardo theorized it as the deterministic consequence of  a natural law. Moreover, taking into
account that the time between the appearance of  Ricardo’s theory and that of  Smith was a pe-
riod of  deterioration in the social and economic status of  the working class (Rubin 1989 [1929],
226), it is perhaps not difficult to understand why Ricardo was «more pessimistic than Smith
was» (Stirati 1994, 151) about the tendencies in real wages (also see Rubin, ibidem, 205; Brew-
er 2002, 363-364).
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wages should be left to the fair and free competition of  the market, and should nev-
er be controlled by the interference of  the legislature.
Thus Ricardo (like Smith)1 did not recognise in his Principles any capac-
ity of  trade unions action to improve labourers’ income.
2. 2. The General Theoretical Framework of  the Wages Fund Theory
and Aspects of  Mill’s Specific Approach in his Principles
The different variants of  the wages fund theory were the central argu-
ment around which the conception of  distribution was organized in
post-Ricardian classical analyses. This theoretical approach is given its
first comprehensive form in the works of  James Mill and McCulloch
(Rubin 1989 [1929], 205, 313; Schumpeter 1994 [1954], 667; Forget 1992, 35;
see also Stirati 1994, 177-179 and 1999, 204-207). As a theory of  supply and
demand it represents a considerable theoretical retreat from the Ricar-
dian theory of wages because of  its abandonment of  any search for a
center of  gravity for wages.
Different formulations of  the wages fund theory have been put for-
ward by its various exponents (e.g. Stirati 1994, 1999) but a full discussion
of  this point is beyond the scope of  this paper. Here we are going to fo-
cus on some aspects of  Mill’s peculiar argumentation. Davanzati (2002)
has provided a brief  but comprehensive analysis of  the internal incon-
sistencies and the lack of  realism of  the wages fund theory.
A number of  contemporary analyses perpetuate an assertion that Mill
addressed to James Mill and McCulloch, putting forward a variant of  the
wages fund theory in real terms within a simplified model that portrays
overall social production as taking place in discrete production periods
(see, for example, Ekelund 1976, Ekelund and Kordsmeier 1991 [1981],
West and Hafer 1991 [1978], Negishi 1985). In such a model the wages
fund (i.e., the demand for labour) comprises the total amount of  con-
sumer goods that can sustain labour in the given production period, a
sum that is determined in the course of  the previous period. Wage goods
are represented as something entirely separate from luxury goods. If  the
given material fund of  wages is distributed between a certain number of
1 If  Ricardo’s pessimistic view of  the capacity of  trade union action to achieve income ben-
efits for the working class reflected a similar pessimism about the prospects for capitalist de-
velopment in the longer run, Smith’s doubts about the usefulness of  trade unions action on
the contrary derived from institutional factors, namely the context of  capitalist class domina-
tion (Smith 1981 [1776], i.viii.13, also see below, section 3. 2.). Within this context of  class dom-
ination, in his Wealth of  Nations, as we have already seen above, Smith attributed the fate of
labourers to the weakness of  their spontaneously emerging bargaining power in relation to the
variety of  conditions prevailing on the labour market as a result of  similarly diverse trends in
the economy (stationary, declining, or growing rapidly) (ibidem, i.viii). On this subject also see
Stirati 1994, 50 ff. We will return below to some other related aspects of  the Smithian ‘bar-
gaining’ argument.
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existing labourers (i.e., the supply of  labour) real wages will be endoge-
nously determined. Although the supply of  wage goods is stable through-
out the specific production period, it could not remain unchanged in-
definitely. In the long run it will follow the dynamic of  capital
accumulation in accordance with the investment (saving) choices of  cap-
italists (Schumpeter 1994 [1954], 666; Breit 1967, 510; Ekelund 1976, 78).
If  we accept the preceding problematic we inevitably reach the
 following conclusion: an inflexible distributional relationship is imposed
between capital and labour. The wages fund, as a natural supply of
commodities, is at every moment strictly ordered outside of  every in-
stitutional and social determination. Real wages can improve only in-
sofar as fewer workers share the same wages fund. There can thus be
no wage rises for workers as a whole. A permanent increase in wages
would put a section of  the labour force out of  employment. In the long
run the wages fund can only increase through voluntary investment by
capitalists (i.e., decisions to increase savings). Once capitalists make
their decisions on the structure of  capitalist accumulation (savings), the
magnitude of the wages fund is rigorously prescribed and labourers
must indisputably come to terms with these strictly predetermined lim-
itations. This was the ‘rigid’ or ‘vulgar’ version of the wages fund the-
ory, the central argument evoked by the capitalist class to justify its op-
position to the demands of  workers (Biagini 1987; Clements 1961, 95-96;
Ekelund 1976, 67-69; West and Hafer 1991 [1978], 148; Davanzati 2002,
467; Stirati 1994, 1999).1
It has frequently been noted that although Mill typically fails to make
it clear whether the wages fund is comprised of  commodities or mon-
ey, he evidently elaborates his argumentation in monetary terms (Hol-
lander 1987, 220; Forget 1992, 39; Breit 1967, 522). This conclusion is re-
inforced by his own related formulations, in which the term ‘wages’ «of
course» denotes «money wages» (1976 [1871], ii.xi.§2). There neverthe-
less remains an ambiguity which for an entire century after Smith, ac-
cording to Taussig (1968 [1896], 145), continued to crop up in virtually all
discussions on wages.
We cannot but agree with Forget (1992, 39) when she says that «by spec-
ifying the fund in monetary terms» Mill succeeds in placing emphasis on
its flexibility. When workers are paid in money, the rigid distinction be-
tween wage goods and luxury goods no longer applies.2 Even if  wage
goods are to be regarded as something separate from luxury goods, an
1 As we saw above, an exogenously (or else extra-economically) cultural-political centre of
gravity of  real wages predefined from class struggle could be extrapolated from Ricardian analy-
sis. But in a way the wages fund theory implies the exact opposite. The total wages fund is now
predefined quite independently of  class struggle, thereafter (endogenously) determining real wages.
2 For a brief  critique of  this distinction see Davanzati 2002, 465.
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increase in the monetary (wages) fund will soon generate a correspon-
ding increase in the commodity (wages) fund. This is  because if  the
workers are in a position to spend more, prices will go up and invest-
ments will be encouraged in the sector of  wage goods (Forget, ibidem).
But although (notwithstanding the assertions of  the ‘rigid’ or ‘vulgar’
version of  the wages fund theory) this flexibility could in principle be
thought to make possible a flexibility in relations of  distribution and in-
dividual incomes, it is not utilized by Mill in his analysis in Principles to
move the argument in such a direction. As we shall endeavour to demon-
strate below, the fate of  the individual wage earner is sealed with or without
increases in the monetary wages fund, insofar as – in Mill’s specific variant
of  the theory – he/she is subject to a rigid law of  population (and by ex-
tension to activation of  the so-called law of diminishing fertility of land).
And given that this is the way things are, trade-union activity is, if  not
damaging, at least lacking in any beneficial dimension, unless it can suc-
ceed in thwarting the operation of  precisely this law of  population.
2. 3. Mill’s Argument on Trade Unions in Principles:
Back to the Malthusian Population Principle
The majority of  economists and popularizing journalists of  Mill’s day
were in the habit of  regarding the wages fund theory as an inviolable nat-
ural law or, at the very least, as an obvious outcome of  the application
of  common sense (see Clements 1961, 94-96; Breit 1967, 511; Rubin 1989
[1929], 313 ff.). Mill, of  course, was more flexible in his analysis in Princi-
ples. His view was that above and beyond the wages fund theory there
might possibly exist alternative institutional ways «for remodelling the
relation between labourers and employers» (Mill 1976 [1871], ii.xii.§1).
Mill’s position (ibidem, ii.xii.§1) is that one cannot exclude from dis-
cussion the contingency whereby through «law or opinion» and (why
not) through trade union activity, higher real wages would be accom-
plished. This, however, would unfortunately involve a certain part of  the
existing working population being, or remaining, out of  work (in Mill’s
own words: «some labourers are kept out of  employment»: ibidem).
In Mill’s analysis the wages fund can be interpreted as being a prede-
termined amount of  savings, set aside by decisions of  the capitalists for the
support of  labourers (Stirati 1999, 207). The abovementioned unem-
ployment by this logic could only be eliminated through additional cap-
ital accumulation, i.e. additional capitalist savings. But the capitalists
might not be willing cut down their consumption in favour of  savings
for the sake of  pursuing such a project of  investment. The state might
then feel constrained to intervene in the distributive relations between
capital and labour by introducing «compulsory saving», a «forced in-
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crease of  the wages fund» through imposition of  additional taxes on cap-
italist luxury consumption («superfluities», Mill ibidem, ii.xii.§1, §2). In this
way an additional capital fund would be raised which could restore full
employment at a higher level of  wages. Note that the overall wages fund
would (indirectly) become flexible as a result of  state intervention via taxation.
If  the moral influence of  opinion does not induce the rich to spare from their con-
sumption enough to set all the poor to work at ‘reasonable wages,’ it is supposed to
be incumbent on the state to lay on taxes for the purpose […]. The proportion be-
tween labour and the wages-fund would thus be modified to the advantage of  the
labourers, not by restrictions of  population, but by an increase of  capital. […] Soci -
ety mainly consists of  those who live by bodily labour; and if  society, that is if  the
labourers, lend their physical force to protect individuals in the enjoyment of  super-
fluities, they are entitled to do so, and have always done so, with the reservation of
a power to tax those superfluities for purposes of  public utility; among which pur-
poses the subsistence of  the people is the foremost.
(Mill 1976 [1871], ii.xii.§1, §2)
Mill’s reasoning is based on two necessary presuppositions, which he him-
self avoids elaborating in his text. Firstly, taxation of  capitalist super-
fluities does not alter the volume of  predetermined capitalist savings.
Secondly, and in consequence, while wage increases do indeed reduce
total profits, they do not reduce the rate of  capital growth. Reduction
in demand for luxuries will be accompanied by a corresponding in-
crease in demand for wage goods, resulting in a transfer of  capital from
production of  the former to production of  the latter (Mill ibidem, i.v.§3).
However – and this is the crucial point in Mill’s reasoning – the high-
er incomes for labour achieved by virtue of  the preceding process are
not expected to be of  great duration. The State-mediated wage increas -
es will have negative consequences for accumulation, not because they re-
duce the profitability of  capital but because they trigger an uncontrolled popu-
lation increase. Due to diminishing fertility of  land this situation will
sooner or later lead to a reduction in real labour income, probably at
levels still lower than the initial equilibrium (ibidem, ii.xii.§ 2). Let us fo-
cus on some aspects of  Mill’s argument:
Any contrivance, even if  successful, for temporarily improving the condition of  the
very poor, would but let slip the reins by which population was previously curbed;
and could only, therefore, continue to produce its effect, if, by the whip and spur of
taxation, capital were compelled to follow at an equally accelerated pace. But this
process could not possibly continue for long together, and whenever it stopped, it
would leave the country with an increased number of  the poorest class, and a di-
minished proportion of  all except the poorest, or, if  it continued long enough, with
none at all.
(Mill 1976 [1871], ii.xii.§ 4)
The abovementioned conclusion applies only when account is taken of
the Malthusian population principle in its strictly biological dimension,
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something which in no way presupposes the demand and supply frame-
work of  the wages fund theory and indeed is apparently inconsistent
with it.1 When Mill examines the political action of  trade unions he in
effect beats a hasty retreat to the well-tested Ricardian arguments of
population law and the law of  diminishing returns of  the soil, eschew-
ing any notion of  supply of  labour and of  labour incomes that could be
separable from these laws. His view is evidently that labourers should
abandon ambitious claims unless and until they are capable of  provi-
dent management of  their improved incomes.
The above argumentation by Mill contradicts Breit’s observation
(1967, 510; emphasis added) that the «major policy implication» of  the
wages fund doctrine was to render «labour unions, factory legislation,
and other institutional means of  raising wages […] futile and self-con-
tradictory because they merely reduced aggregate profits and, therefore,
investment».2 In accordance with Mill’s specific train of  thought, al-
though trade union action would result in unemployment, the required
increase in (real) labour income may in principle become possible
through State intervention by means of  taxation of  capitalist luxury
consumption, without changing the level of  employment. Such intervention
would bring into operation an additional wages fund (forced accumu-
lation). But here we are talking about something entirely temporary and po-
tentially extremely destructive. These higher (real) labour wages slacken
control over population increase, reshaping workers’ cultural habits. Al-
though in an initial phase it may appear possible that State intervention
could effect a redistribution of  income in favour of  wage earners (high-
er real individual wages in conditions of  full employment) it is also quite
on the cards that the real income of  the individual wage earner could
fall, given that population is rising and inferior-quality land is coming
into cultivation. Continuation of  such pro-labour State policies for the
purpose of  maintaining a higher level of  real wage income may well
lead in the final analysis not just to unemployment but to greater im-
poverishment than existed in the first place, and even to the country’s
overall economic ruin. Despite the fact, therefore, that Mill perceives
the wages fund as being relatively flexible, he does not acknowledge the
possibility of trade unions (and ultimately the State) being able to in-
1 In keeping with the total inflexibility of  distributive relations, in the ‘rigid’ or ‘vulgar’ ver-
sion of the wages fund theory, there can be no question of  increases in workers’ income lead-
ing to an increase in population. Any increase in individual wages for a given wage fund would
simply lead to direct increases in unemployment (and so would reduce, not increase, popula-
tion). For Mill, by contrast, it is the very flexibility of the monetary wages fund that generates
the theoretical possibility of  resort to a law of  population.
2 Breit’s stance is not of  course incompatible with the overall logic of  Mill’s text. It is nev-
ertheless evident that, not taking into consideration the population principle that is embodied
in Mill’s argumentation, he does not give a proper account of  Mill’s specific train of  thought.
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fluence the distribution of  income and the level of real wages of  the to-
tality of  workers. His argumentation in this respect continues to bear
the mark of  its Ricardian origins.
Mill’s position is thus that the best and most reliable measure, un-
doubtedly, for relieving unemployment and poverty is prudential re-
straint on population growth. Trade unions must therefore abstain
from the struggle for higher incomes, focusing their attention exclu-
sively on reforming the reproductive habits of  the working class. This,
through restriction of  the labour supply, could lead to rises in wages
(Mill 1976 [1871], ii.xii.§ 4, § 2). Notwithstanding some minor vacillations
of  phrasing in successive editions of  Principles, Mill’s argumentation on
this point is unflinching (also see Evans 1989, 287; West and Hafer 1991
[1978], 156). Mill in other words proposed to his trade union friends that
they should abandon their ineffectual class demands and adopt a ‘con-
traception’ strategy. Trade unions, in other words, should be converted
into cultural and educational associations,1 capable of  instilling labourers
with a morality that might induce them to control their numbers.2
2. 4. Conclusion: The Classical ‘Consensus’ Against Trade Union Pretensions
So, as far as the question of  trade union activity is concerned, what is
involved here may well be consolidation of  a prevailing theoretical con-
sensus among the key classical writers. From Smith and Ricardo (al-
though with notable deviations in the latter case) to his epigones, the
shared assumption was the notion that trade union activity, whatever else
could be said about it, is in any case of  no benefit. Either by virtue of  the ef-
fects of  the Malthusian population law (in its strict biological dimen-
sion) or by those of  the mechanism of  supply and demand (the wages
fund theory) any extra-economic institutional determination of  long-run re-
al wages is precluded. Even Mill, the so called ‘progressive’ intellectual of
that period, did not believe that the political action of  trade unions
could achieve any positive re-distribution for the working class as a
whole, since any initial increase in the wages fund would merely open
1 This political schedule was reconciled with the overall ideological platform that safe-
guarded capitalist hegemony in mid-Victorian Great Britain. In a very interesting analysis,
Tholfsen 1971, 61 pointed out that after the defeat of 1848 outbreaks «concern with injustice
and inequality receded, and a preoccupation with personal improvement and advancement
came to the fore. Workingmen gave their unqualified allegiance to an ethic of  improvement
which exalted the intellectual and moral development of  the individuals as the highest good».
2 We should not confuse Mill’s advice on a voluntary reduction in the number of  labourers
through reformation of  the reproductive habits of  the working class with Ricardo’s (speculat-
ed) cultural minimum. In our view Ricardo’s cultural-political centre of  gravity is imposed by
class struggle (that is to say, in the long run class struggle determines income distribution),
while Mill’s ‘contraception’ strategy implies a given relation of  distribution between capital
and labour, to which workers must adapt, and in the context of  which they could improve their
individual income by self-limiting their physical reproduction.
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the prospect of  greater poverty and even possible economic ruin. The
formation of  unions would succeed in ensuring the interest of  labour-
ers only by contributing to their cultural and moral improvement, and
above all establishing a ‘contraception’ strategy.
In any case, in their direct negotiations with employers, trade unions
had no options other than to comply with the terms of  what was
 evidently an immutable ‘iron law’ governing the income distribution
between capital and labour. This logic had to a large extent prevailed
in workers’ unions, roughly by the early 1870s (Breit 1967, 511; Biagini
1987, 824).
3. The first Powerful Reactions in the 1860s
against Wages Fund Notions and Mill’s new Stance
3. 1. Introducing Trade Unions Into Mainstream Political Economy
The upturn in workers’ struggles through the 1860s imposed a signifi-
cant shift in the social role of  trade unions, beginning to transform them
from mutual aid associations to important political factors and negotiators
(Schumpeter 1994 [1954], 759-760; Breit 1967, 513). It is this ‘reappearance’
of  the proletariat on the political scene that led to the first legislative re-
forms, which initially allowed for only an elemental form of  labour or-
ganization, including negotiation of  strikes (Hobsbawm 1996 [1975],
113). In Britain, indeed, the political weight of  the working class move-
ments was so great that, after a transition period (1867-1875), it managed
to generate a system of  legal recognition relatively favourable to trade
unionism1 (Hobsbawm, ibidem, 113-114). It is in any case no coincidence
that the very same period saw the establishment of  the first Interna-
tional Workers Association (1864). The strike movement in Great
Britain reached a climax between 1871 and 1873, with new trade unions
continually appearing (Hobsbawm, ibidem, 109, 112-113).
At the political level a strengthened trade union movement within
which a moderate reformist strategy was the predominant current had
become an irrevocable reality (Hobsbawm, ibidem, 113-114). Legislation
was revised in such a way as to be able to accommodate collective bar-
gaining between workers and employers. This new element in eco-
nomic life began gradually to be introduced into the mainstream theo-
retical discussion of  the period. It is precisely at this time that the first
serious theoretical attacks made their appearance against the dominant
wages fund theory. The main purpose of  these attacks was not to per-
1 The objective purpose of  these reforms from the viewpoint of  the capitalist State was
 obviously control-subjection of  the politically dangerous working class movement, so as to
prevent its transformation into an independent revolutionary power.
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suade people of  the exploitative nature of  capitalism. In keeping with
the new social reality, they attempted to mount a defence of  the activi-
ty of  the trade union movement.
Mill’s personal friend Professor Fawcett was unquestionably a leading
representative of  this new current in economic thought. Noteworthy
interventions were also made by Longe in 1866 and Thomas Thornton
in 1869 (the latter also being a friend of  Mill’s, see Breit 1967, Bharadwaj
1978, Negishi 1986). Less well-known are the objections to the wages
fund theory that came from the German economists Hermann and
Rodbertus (Rubin 1989 [1929], 316). There can be no doubt, however,
that particular interest was aroused by Mill’s attempt to modify the the-
oretical framework of  the wages fund theory. We should never lose
sight of  the fact that, in contrast to the abovementioned economists,
Mill was the most famous intellectual of  his era.
In a review of  the aforementioned Thornton’s work, published in two
parts in the May and June 1869 numbers of  Fortnightly Review, Mill at-
tempted publicly to modify the analysis of  wage formation he had put
forward in Principles. In the secondary literature this intervention is
known as his ‘recantation’ of  the wages fund theory. The intentions of
Mill’s ‘rejection’ in 1869 of  the dominant wages doctrine constitute one
of  the most difficult problems in the history of  economics (Hollander
1987, 221; Ekelund 1976, 84).
Summarizing the debate in an unexpected aside in the first part of  his
article, Mill acknowledged that the new theoretical point at issue was
whether trade unions could after all achieve general wage increases for
the all workers without causing unemployment. As we have already dis-
cussed, this eventuality was excluded in his analysis in Principles:
The doctrine hitherto taught by all or most economists (including myself ), which
 denied it to be possible that trade combinations can raise wages (…) this doctrine is
deprived of  its scientific foundation, and must be thrown aside.
(Mill 1975 [1869], 646)
Mill was even more explicit in his personal correspondence with Faw-
cett, insisting that he «could show that an increase of  wages at the ex-
pense of  profits would not be an impracticability on the true principles
of  political economy» (cited in Kurer 1998, 533).
Admittedly, in his analysis in Principles, Mill had agreed that a gener-
al increase in wages for the working class as a whole by means of  forced
savings through taxation was in principle a possibility – but in the final
analysis harmful, because of  the influence of  the law of  population and
the declining fertility of  the land. Nevertheless even when achieved by
this means it was seen as something only marginally significant, and he
himself  had never maintained that the trade unions would be able on
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their own to impose changes to the overall wages fund, redistributing
profits to the advantage of  wage earners. The essence of  the recanta-
tion, as we shall see below, consists in the proposition that trade unions
not only can but also should impose a general redistribution of  profits,
obliging the capitalists to carry out forced savings and accumulation,
without this requiring State intervention and without the increase in wages
causing unemployment or being neutralized by the workings of  the law of  pop-
ulation. Where in Principles aggressive trade union activity was con-
demned as harmful, now it was not only justified as necessary but also
represented as effective. Let us look more closely at Mill’s new train of
thought.
3. 2. Mill’s Recantation of  the Wages Fund Theory:
Making Room for Trade Unions
In the 1869 paper (and specifically in its first part), Mill appears to have
been influenced by Thornton. The latter’s intervention provided him
with a good opportunity to test some new analytical positions justify-
ing trade union action. Although Thornton’s critique of  supply and de-
mand analysis in general and wages fund theory in particular was based
on the existence of  disequilibrium prices, Mill insisted on the quite dif-
ferent case of  multiple equilibria (for more see Mill 1975 [1869], 642-643;
Negishi 1986, 576; Kurer 1998, 527; West and Hafer 1991 [1978], 151-154).
This becomes obvious when Mill examines the difference between
Dutch and English auctions (Mill 1975 [1869], 636-637). Both are repre-
sented in the following diagram, where the vertical inelastic supply
curve coincides with the corresponding inelastic section of  the demand
curve. While Mill is not interested in the details of  curve shapes, his
analysis is based on the above presupposition about them.1
1 On this point, the analyses of  Negishi 1986 and Kurer 1998 in our view provide an accu-
rate rendition of  Mill’s argument. Although Mill makes no explicit reference to supply and de-
mand curves, his entire argumentation hints at some such idea or at any rate could be inter-
preted as doing so. The quantity supplied and the quantity demanded of  a commodity is not
«at any time a fixed quantity, but varies with the price» (Mill 1975 [1869], 635). Hence, «the de-
mand and supply theory, when rightly understood […] signifies, that the ratio which exists be-
tween demand and supply, when the price has adjusted itself, is always one of  equality. If  at the
market price the demand exceeds the supply, the competition of  buyers will drive up the price
to the point at which there will only be purchasers for as much as is offered for sale» (ibidem,
635-636). The opposite will occur when the supply exceeds the demand. However, as we dis-
cover later in his text, Mill’s view is that there are markets on which demand behaves in a pe-
culiar fashion, not subordinating itself  to the rule «that demand increases with cheapness» (that
is to say the relation between price and quantity demanded does not always apply conversely).
Thus, «if  there is a part of  the scale through which the price may vary without increasing or
diminishing the demand, the whole of  that portion of  the scale may fulfil the condition of
equality between supply and demand» (ibidem, 637). This is precisely a vertical demand curve
situation.
36 Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos · George Economakis
In the first case – the Dutch auction – the bids come from the sellers,
who in this way retain the «initiative of  price». It is expected that the sell-
er will initiate the auction starting with a very high supply price (high-
er than pa) so as to achieve a favourable equilibrium price for himself,
let’s say pa. In the English auction, by contrast, bids come from the buy-
ers, who will choose a low price to initiate (rather lower than pc). When
we are in the vertical section AC of  the demand curve, in other words,
the partner in the transaction retaining the «initiative of  price» is in a
favourable position to impose equilibrium prices in accordance with
his/her interests (Mill, ibidem).
For Mill cases such as the above pertaining to the supply and demand
mechanism are not some characteristic «exceptions» but reflect the pre-
dominant reality of  the labour market (ibidem, 642). Wages fund theo-
ry thus requires modification.
Mill’s argumentation evolves as follows. When the demand and sup-
ply mechanism leads to alternative equilibrium prices – leaving «the
price in part indeterminate, because there is more than one price which
would fulfil the law» (ibidem, 642) – and accordingly «there is some
amount of  indeterminateness in its operation» (ibidem, 637), for the con-
figuration of  the one final price we must take into account the particu-
lar bargaining process. That is how the labour market is institutionally
 organized. In that market, Mill argues, the employer enjoys the institu-
tional advantage of  always negotiating from a stronger position than
the employee. The former possesses the «initiative of  price» (ibidem,
642-643) and so takes advantage of  «the inability of  labourers to hold
out» (ibidem, 646).
Mill’s analysis revives – through Thornton of  course – an argument
that was first introduced by Smith. According to Smith capitalists’ and
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labourers’ interests are in no way to be identified with each other. Since
capitalists «are always and everywhere in a sort of  tacit, but constant
and uniform combination» and are protected by the law, they possess a
powerful advantage in the wage struggle (Smith 1981 [1776], i.viii.11-13).
It is not difficult for them to «force the other [party] into a compliance
with their terms» (ibidem). By contrast, labourers are in an institution-
ally disadvantageous position and «very seldom derive any advantage
from the violence of  [their] tumultuous combinations» (ibidem). This is
due «partly from the interposition of  the civil magistrate, partly from
the superior steadiness of  the masters, partly from the necessity which
the greater parts of  the workmen are under of  submitting for the sake
of  present subsistence» (ibidem).
All this may be seen from a perusal of  the vertical segment AC in the
above diagram. If  labourers are not unionized they are evidently not in
a position to resist the pressure of  capitalist intentions and they will in
the end accept any price between wa and wc. The capitalists, on the oth-
er hand, who can easily enter into agreement with each other, have no
difficulty in suppressing competition between themselves, as evident
from the inelasticity of  the relevant demand curve. If  we confine our at-
tention to an examination of  AC, it appears immediately obvious that a
reduction in price will not result in any increase in the quantity de-
manded.
It is precisely here that the essential shift in Mill’s views is to be locat-
ed. In Principles he had accepted one and only one factor for improving
wages, and that as a counterbalance to the consequences of  the law of
population: control of  the labour supply. Now he was not only ques-
tioning the effect of  the population law but also acknowledging an addi-
tional independent factor. Counterbalancing the privileged position of
capitalists, the trade unions (and not the State), can and should impose
an overall redistribution of  profits, and such a redistribution is no longer
vain, since it leads neither to unemployment (the result of  trade-union
action in the pre-recantation Mill), nor to increase in population (the re-
sult of  State-organized political redistribution in favour of  labour in the
pre-recantation Mill). If  trade unions do not do this, employers will in-
sist on «low bids» and will finally impose low equilibrium wages, «lower
than there is any natural necessity for». It may be helpful, at this point,
to quote the following extract from Mill’s 1869 paper:
It has made it necessary for us to contemplate [here Mill refers to Thornton’s inter-
vention], not as an impossibility but as a possibility, that employers, by taking ad-
vantage of  the inability of  labourers to hold out, may keep wages lower than there is any
natural necessity for; and è converso, that if  work-people can by combination be enabled
to hold out so long as to cause an inconvenience to the employers greater than that
of  a rise of  wages, a rise may be obtained which, but for the combination, not only
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would not have happened so soon, but possibly might not have happened at all. The
power of  Trades Unions may therefore be so exercised as to obtain for the labouring
classes collectively, both a larger share and a larger positive amount of  the produce
of  labour; increasing, therefore, one of  the two factors on which the remuneration of  the in-
dividual labourer depends. The other and still more important factor, the number of
sharers, remains unaffected by any of  the considerations now.
(Mill 1975 [1869], 646; emphasis added)
Political action by trade unions is absolutely justified. It will not be de-
terred by any population principle or condition (the «number of  shares
remains unaffected»), and will not turn against working class interests
by causing unemployment and/or lowering wages. The wage pay-
ments will be determined in keeping with bargaining conditions be-
tween capital and labour and not within a framework of  autonomous
variables (predetermined wages fund, magnitude of  labour popula-
tion). Every change in power correlations to the benefit of  labour will
move the equilibrium point nearer to A. This justifies the emphasis
placed by Mill on the direct variability of  the wages fund, which is now
able be augmented (as a limit) to the extent of  the capitalist’s entire in-
come: «if he [the capitalist] has to pay more for labour, the additional
payment comes out of his own income; perhaps from the part which
he would have saved and added to capital, thus anticipating his volun-
tary economy by a compulsory one; perhaps from what he would have
expended on his private wants or pleasures» (ibidem, 645).
The above analysis stands only as long as the vertical supply curve SS´
coincides with the relatively inelastic segment AC of  the demand curve
DD´. In elastic segments, DA or CD´, equilibrium wages would be uni-
vocally determined. The same would apply if  we had postulated an elas-
tic supply curve. Mill, however, does not seem particularly concerned
about the ‘technical’ details of  his examples. The analysis he puts for-
ward in the rest of  his 1869 recantation paper ends with the final conclu-
sion that, besides capitalist accumulation and working population, bar-
gaining conditions themselves also (i.e. besides labour supply) determine
equilibrium wages.1 But this can hardly be described as a ‘supply and de-
mand mechanism’.
3. 3. Conclusions: the reformist Strategy for the Trade Unions
It is however worth noting that Mill’s analysis in his article of  1869 is not
without its hesitations. The conclusions of  the previous paragraph are
based on the argumentation of  the first part of  his recantation article.
By contrast, in the second section of  the same article Mill provides a
 partial recapitulation of  the arguments on the rigid wages fund and
1 Kurer 1998, 531-532 came to a similar conclusion.
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(Malthusian) population law, in its vulgar (biological) dimension. Al-
though continuing to oppose viewpoints advocating a ban on trade
unions and evidently very critical of  the notion that trade unions vio-
late the freedoms of  those workers who do not desire to become union-
ized (Mill 1975 [1869], 658-659), Mill’s findings in many ways resemble
the corresponding conclusions of  the Principles: «so long, at least, as
there are any classes of labourers who are not unionized, the successes
of the Unions will generally be a cause of loss to the labourers in the
non-unionist occupations» (ibidem, 661-662).
This point was also noted by West and Hafer (1991 [1978], 156) who cor-
rectly pointed out that «in all the editions of  the Principles […] and in Part
ii of  the Thornton review, Mill assumed that unions could typically suc-
ceed in keeping up the wages of  their members only by limiting the
number of  entrants into the trade […]. Mill’s major support of  trade
unions is ultimately based entirely upon different reasoning, namely, the
Malthusian argument». These hesitations on the part of  Mill have led
other writers also to the conclusion that Mill’s position in the recanta-
tion involved nothing new. This is a thesis put forward in a substantial
part of  the relevant secondary literature: Taussig (1968 [1896], 248-249),
Hollander (1968, 1987), Breit (1967, 522), West and Hafer (1991 [1978], 157-
158), Ekelund (1976, 102), Ekelund and Kordsmeier (1991 [1981], 171).
Our view is that there is no uniform economic problematic permeating the
1869 text and that in any case the arguments of  Mill that we described in
the preceding paragraph retain their own specific autonomy. Thus, despite
the very real hesitations, in the 1869 text there is for the first time a percepti-
ble shift in Mill’s argumentation. We are led to the same conclusion as Kur-
er (1998, 532): evidently «Mill had good reasons to recant».
We very definitely disagree then with the argumentation of Forget
(1992), who questions the analytical content of  Mill’s recantation,1
maintaining that it was only political factors that led him to a theoreti-
cally vacuous self-criticism of  the relevant theses of  the Principles, since
the wages fund was monetary in form and thus in Mill’s analysis in any
case flexible. In our opinion, the recantation does possess theoretical content.
Indeed it is from precisely this perspective that it is also politically ex-
pedient. The (contradictory) shift comprising the main argumentation
of the first part of Mill’s recantation article is as follows: firstly, there is
a retraction of  the problematic that trade union activity will inevitably
1 Mill himself, however, was of  a different opinion. In a letter dated 9th April 1869 Mill asks
the opinion of  Cairnes in relation to the first section of  the article. Indicatively he notes: «I feel
pretty sure you will concur in what I have written on the so-called wages fund, a subject on which
I expressed myself in my Political Economy as inaccurately as other people, and which I have only
within the last two or three years seen in its proper light» (cited in Ekelund 1976, 66; empha-
sis added).
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lead to unemployment (that is to say the problematic of  a given inflex-
ible redistributive relationship), secondly there is retraction of  the effect
of  the law of  population and the law of  diminishing returns as in-
evitable consequences of  increases in workers’ wages. Our view is thus
that although the relative flexibility of the money wages fund in Mill
does not by itself  lead to the recantation positions (or, as we attempted
to show is not to be equated with its theoretical content), it has howev-
er made the shift theoretically possible, or perhaps to be more accurate
made theoretically easier. Here too we therefore disagree with the
claim of  Kurer (1998, 534) that «the Principles is dominated by a wages-
fund doctrine of the iron-clad sort». Flexibility of  the money wages
fund is thus compatible with Mill’s recantation, but the latter is activat-
ed by his political sensitivity towards workers’ trade union activity,
something that Kurer (ibidem, 533) also accepts. In this sense it is the de-
veloping dynamic of  the labour movement that has activated the pre-existing
potential for flexibility of  the wages fund of  Mill’s Principles towards defend-
ing trade union struggle.
With the new, albeit incomplete, analytical framework,1 notwith-
standing the ambiguities of  his recantation, Mill supports a new ‘strat-
egy of  intervention’ for the trade unions, in parallel with a ‘strategy of
contraception’. In accordance with it, workers’ wage demands are pro-
jected as necessary. The trade unions can and must intervene to config-
ure workers’ income through processes of  bargaining and not just
through birth control. This process causes neither unemployment nor
a rise in population. It therefore does not operate against the interests
of  the working class. Different forms of  bargaining between labour and cap-
ital result in different points of  equilibrium, all presupposing full employment.
Insofar as the law of  population is inactive and (if  one is to judge from
the first part of  Mill’s ‘recantation’ article) the wages fund is the out-
come of  this bargaining, real wages are institutionally, extra-economi-
cally or exogenously determined.
Mill’s recantation was dictated first and foremost by the need for po-
litical economy to keep in step with the new institutional and social re-
ality of  an emerging and now legal working class syndicalism. To the
extent that it demonstrated the desirability and feasibility of  worker de-
1 In the new edition of  Principles published subsequent to his recantation, Mill, now ad-
vanced in years and with health problems, was not able to renegotiate and incorporate its the-
oretical and political conclusions. Thus, in the introduction to the final – seventh – edition (1871)
of  the Principles, the only one to be published after the recantation of  1869, commenting on the
relevant dialogue on the theory of  wages fund, Mill notes that: «additional light has been
thrown on these subjects; but the results, in author’s opinion, are not yet ripe for incorpora-
tion in a general treatise on Political Economy» (Mill 1976 [1871], xxxi). There is no amend-
ment of  any point in the basic analysis.
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mands in the context of  the exploitative relationship of  wage labour,
the theoretical legitimation of  trade union activity offered by Mill’s analy-
sis, even in the absence of  questioning such a relationship, in the given
conjuncture constituted a potentially worker-friendly reformist strate-
gy. It does not appear to have been altogether foreign to the inclinations
of  Mill himself. It is well-known that towards the end of  his life he main-
tained contact with trade unionists and supported liberal parliamentary
candidates who were on the side of  the workers’ organizations (Dobb
1975 [1973], 126). It is also well-known that in the 1860s Mill believed that
liberal reforms could be achieved only through a fusion of  elements of
the working class and petty-bourgeois ideologies. He accordingly be-
gan to see political economy as a bridge between the two, and he sought
to incorporate some working-class ideals into his own theoretical sys-
tem (Forget 1992, 46-47). As characteristically noted by Forget (ibidem):
«Mill saw his own special province as the reform of middle-class opin-
ion; he intended to make the well-to-do more sympathetic to labor in-
terests, and this involved undermining the fallacious system of political
economy adopted by the middle and upper classes».
Nevertheless, the British trade unions did not find it easy to accept
even the reformist strategy that emerged by implication from Mill’s in-
tervention. For many years following Mill’s recantation, the workers’
publications and the trade union leaders remained ensnared in the the-
ory of  supply and demand. It was only between 1874 and 1877 (in the af-
termath of  the strike wave of  1871-1873. See above) that they began to
include the new input in their argumentation. It seems that the main
reason for this delay was the adaptation of  the workers’ leaders to the
climate of  arbitration and compromise as a means for handling work-
ers’ demands (for details see Biagini 1987, 822-932; and also Hobsbawm
1996 [1975], 114).
4. Marx’s Intervention
in the political Conjuncture of the 1860s
4. 1. Marx’s General Political Project
Though the founding of  the International coincides with the emer-
gence of  the labour movement, there was a parallel process of  reformist
incorporation of  the working class into capitalist strategy. The in-
creased economic prosperity of  that period, the legalisation of  trade
unions, the corresponding predominance of  «diffident and corrupt»
«liberal» labour leaders, who «tried to […] convince public opinion that
(trade unions) did not pose a threat to the constitution» (Biagini 1987,
812), «stimulated the personal ambition of  the bolder and more politi-
cally minded workers towards local self-improvement and the pursuit
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of  immediate ends, and away from the comparatively nebulous ideal of
an international alliance against the bourgeoisie» (Berlin 1996 [1939],
160-161; see also Hobsbawm 1996 [1975], 114; Riazanov 1927, ch. viii). In
these conditions, as Berlin (1996 [1939], 166) mentions, Marx left the In-
ternational «as elastic as he could, in order to be able to include as many
active workers’ organizations as possible, however disparate their meth-
ods and character».
We described earlier how in relation to the theory of  wages and
workers’ unions there are clearly two Mills: the Mill of  Principles and the
Mill of  (the first part of  the) recantation article. Marx’s political strategy
marginally intersects with the politics resulting from Mill’s 1869 analy-
sis. Marx insisted on grounding the International in the real movement
of the labouring masses and the trade unionist objectives that they set
themselves: the «problems of  wage labour and of  hours of  labour»
(Ryazanov, ibidem). Both writers acknowledged an extra-economic deter-
minant establishing the real wages of  labour. Marx, moreover, perceiv-
ing that the specific political conditions of  the period made it possible
for trade unions to function as centres of  political representation, noted
that they played what was for their time a key role in struggling for the
overturn of  the capitalist system of  exploitation. We should not forget
that despite the fact that trade unions were in general terms organiza-
tions of  privileged minorities, on the one hand they were a beachhead
for more ready diffusion of  trade unionism and on the other they were
able to comprise nuclei for the organization of  powerful workers’
movements and so for forms of  political intervention in the political
scene (Hobsbawm 1996 [1975], 109, 224-229).
4. 2. Behind the Scenes of  Marx’s Political and Theoretical Intervention
within the International
Marx’s distinctive theoretical approach emerged in the Manuscripts 1857-
58 (first published in 1939-1941 as Grundrisse) and in his A Contribution to
the Critique of  Political Economy (first published 1859). From that point on-
wards he would be engaged in an intensive effort to bring his system to
completion. By the time of  the establishment of  the First International
he would already have finished the 1861-63 Manuscript (part of which
was first published between 1905 and 1910 under the title Theories of Sur-
plus Value), and had embarked upon his initial draft for the writing of
Capital (see Milios et alii 2002, viii).
Prior to the publication of  the first volume of  Capital in 1867, Marx
delivered an important lecture on the theory of  wages in two presenta-
tions (in Geneva on 20th and 27th June, 1865) to the General Council of
the International. This lecture was finally published in London in 1889
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under the title Wages, Price and Profit. His main purpose was to deliver
before the Council a detailed report in which the significance of  trade
unions in the capitalist process of  production would have been clarified.
As Marx himself  confided in his personal correspondence to Engels
(on 20th May 1865), he had to interrupt his theoretical research in politi-
cal economy because he had judged it necessary to intervene immedi-
ately. In a meeting of  the International, Weston, an old Owenist, had put
up two arguments against trade union action. Firstly, «a general rise of
the rate of  wages would be of  no benefit to the workers», so, secondly,
«the trades unions for that reason, etc., are harmful» (Marx and Engels
1865). According to Marx, «if  these two propositions […] were to be ac-
cepted, we should be in a terrible mess, both in respect of  the trades
unions here and the infection of  strikes now prevailing on the Continent»
(ibidem).
Our analysis will confine itself  to the arguments of  the 1865 lecture,
which is an intervention by Marx in the specific political and theoretical
conjuncture. This intervention inside the International was a form of
indirect participation (Marx was not a well-known writer in his time) in
the previous public discussion on the wages fund theory.1 By criticising
the latter, he gave a first general statement of  his theory of  wages
(which is later more carefully developed in Capital), codifying his general
problematic on this matter.2
We are able to isolate three general arguments, which formed the ba-
sis for his analysis later on in Capital.
Firstly, Marx (1865, ch. ii) criticised Weston’s ‘rigid’ version of  the
wages fund theory. In the argumentation of  Weston, real wages would
remain unchanged, as would the real wages fund. The basic idea was
that an increase in the money value of  wages would lead to a corre-
sponding increase in prices, ultimately leaving real wages and wages
fund unaffected and inflexible. Marx believed, with considerable justifi-
cation, that behind the ‘rigid’ or ‘vulgar’ version of  the wages fund the-
ory of  Weston lay the mistaken value approach of  the «the theory of pro-
duction costs» (see Rubin 1989 [1929]). But he did not stop here. Simply
by raising the question of  whether the income relationship between the
capitalist class and the working class is or is not rigid (the question of
the relations of  income distribution and their flexibility), he in effect laid
the analytical basis for the debate on trade union activity and the
1 «The workers’ legal and political repression was routinely justified by ‘the Laws of  Politi-
cal Economy,’ especially the wage-fund dogma. Marx’s intervention in the wage-fund debate,
though long unrecognized, is one of  his finest achievements» (Lapides 2002, 260).
2 Note that both in his 1865 lecture and later on in Capital, when Marx discussed the wages
fund theory he carefully avoided referring to Mill, who was so closely associated with this the-
ory. For this question see the interesting paper by Evans 1989.
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«amount of  wages». He explicitly admitted that the relation between
wages fund and profit share is manifestly variable (ibidem, ch. i), reject-
ing the more general conception of  the wages fund theory and noting
that «a general rise in the rate of  wages would result in a fall of  the gen-
eral rate of  profit» (ibidem, ch. xiv). For a given «amount of  national
product», total class correlations of  power determine the share of  labour
(see ibidem, ch. ii). There is thus no fixed wages fund whose the size is
determined solely by the investment plans of  the capitalists (for a given
level of  employment). The relations of  income distribution are – with-
in limits – quite flexible, with the capitalist always interested in taking
as much as possible (ibidem, ch. i), so that «the matter resolves itself  in-
to a question of  the respective powers of  the combatants» (ibidem, ch.
xiv). As with wages, levels of  profit are likewise dependent on the social
balance of  forces between capital and labour: «the fixation of  its actual
degree is only settled by the continuous struggle between capital and
labour, the capitalist constantly tending to reduce wages to their physi-
cal minimum, and to extend the working day to its physical maximum,
while the working man constantly presses in the opposite direction»
(Marx 1865, ch. xiv).
Secondly, by emphasizing the distinction between the «physical» and
the «historical» or «social» element, he introduced a relational determi-
nation of  real wages at levels higher, in any case, than the (Ricardian)
«physiological minimum». Prior to the development of  his theoretical
schema on the wages of  labour in Capital, Marx thus perceived that the
(long run) center of  gravity of  real wage is determined historically, i.e.
independently of  the conditions of  the pure economic conjuncture (the
phases of  industrial cycles), that is to say: it is determined extra-econom-
ically or exogenously, as a result of  a historical crystallization of  the bal-
ance of  class forces (on the terrain of  a social formation), only its min-
imum being determined biologically (for this subject see Economakis
and Sotiropoulos 2006).1 By this reasoning no rigid necessity is to be de-
rived from a population law that ties (at long last) real wages to a «phys-
iological» minimum, as implied in Ricardo’s theoretical scheme. Later
in Capital, Marx followed this line of  argumentation to develop the con-
1 He writes in this connection: «there are some peculiar features which distinguish the val-
ue of  the labouring power, or the value of  labour, from the values of  all other commodities. The
value of  the labouring power is formed by two elements – one merely physical, the other his-
torical or social. Its ultimate limit is determined by the physical element» which corresponds to
«the necessaries absolutely indispensable (for the working class) to live and multiply. The value
of  those indispensable necessaries forms, therefore, the ultimate limit of  the value of  labour […].
This historical or social element, entering into the value of  labour [of  labour power], may be
expanded, or contracted, or altogether extinguished, so that nothing remains but the physical
limit» (Marx 1865, ch. xiv). Marx «believes in unlimited technical progress, and rejects the no-
tion of  diminishing returns in agriculture which play such an important role in Ricardo’s sta-
tionary state» (Rowthorn 1984 [1980], 192), and thus in his biological determination of  wages.
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cept of  «industrial reserve army» and so succeeded in vitiating the
Malthusian population law. Through the latter Marx provided an ex-
planation for the oscillations in the market price of  labour around the
historically-determined real wage, at the same time rejecting the notion
of  full employment in the labour market.1
Thirdly, under the peculiar political conditions of  that historical era,
trade unions could become not only «key centres of  resistance» for im-
provement of  workers’ incomes within the limits of  the capitalist sys-
tem but also political centres for «the ultimate abolition of  the wages
system». Marx writes:
They [the trade unions] fail partially from an injudicious use of  their power. They fail
generally from limiting themselves to a guerrilla war against the effects of  the exist-
ing system, instead of  simultaneously trying to change it, instead of  using their or-
ganized forces as a lever for the final emancipation of  the working class that is to say
the ultimate abolition of  the wages system.
(ibidem, ch. xiv; emphasis added)
At the political level, Marx’s decision to attack the ‘rigid’ or ‘vulgar’ ver-
sion of  the wages fund theory was an attempt to impose limits on the
growing co-optation of  the working class into capitalist political strate-
gy. Capitalist economic growth is not an inelastic precondition for every
claim by the working class for a greater share (in both absolute and rel-
ative terms) of  the national product. Such a viewpoint – which ran di-
rectly contrary to trade union leaders’ policy of  conciliation – also com-
prises a necessary theoretical and political link between economic and
political class struggle, freeing labour in its struggle for better living con-
ditions within capitalism from joint responsibility for the condition of
the ‘national’, i.e. for capitalist, development. Under this precondition,
trade unions were supposed to remain not just «centres of  resistance
against the encroachments of  capital» but also political centres for «the
ultimate abolition of  the wages system».
5. Epilogue
In the 1960s, following a long period of  class struggles, the trade union
movement in Great Britain acquired an important institutional role in
the organization of  the political scene. The preceding analysis leads us
to two general conclusions.
Firstly, the changes at the political level undoubtedly also triggered
corresponding shifts in theoretical discussion of wages. Within the
workers’ movement two different political strategies unfolded, identifiable
1 Given that our analysis, as we have already pointed out, confines itself  to the arguments
of  the 1865 lecture, we do not intend in this paper to review Marxian wage theory in Capital (in
this connection see Economakis and Sotiropoulos 2006).
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for the sake of  brevity with the contemporary theoretical interventions
of  Marx and Mill.
The reformist strategy, key reference point for which is undoubtedly
Mill’s paper of  1869 (not without contradictions), sought to orient the
growing radical working class movement towards political targets that
did not involve contestation of  capitalist power. To achieve this end,
Mill had to run against the prevailing theoretical consensus according
to which trade union activity (whatever else could be said about it) is in
any case of  no benefit. Hence, he had to reject both the Malthusian pop-
ulation law and the rigid version of  the wages fund theory, which were
active in his argumentation in Principles. This double rejection, clear
enough in the first part of  his 1869 paper, forms the analytical basis of
his well-known recantation.
On the other hand, from within the First International Workers As-
sociation, Marx tried to utilize every opportunity accorded to him –
such as the political lecture of  1865 – to stress the class nature of  the cap-
italist system and argue for the feasibility of  a revolutionary strategy, pos-
ing the issue of  the overthrow of  capitalist power without denying the
importance of  straightforward economic demands. He seems to have
understood that satisfaction of  the economic interests of  dominated
classes not only does not place limits on the political power of  domi-
nant classes but also constitutes a means for ‘political disorganization’
of  the dominated classes. The economic ‘sacrifices’ that, as Mill sug-
gests, capital is required to undergo, can – with suitable ideological
packaging – be made into an efficacious medium for keeping the dy-
namics of  the movement ‘within the limits of  the system’, stabilizing
bourgeois political hegemony (see Poulantzas 1987 [1968], 190 ff.).
Secondly, the shifts in the theoretical discussion had to do chiefly with
recognition of  the capacity of  the trade unions to impose permanent in-
creases in wages for workers as a whole. In this context, the determina-
tion of  long-run real wages began to be associated first and foremost
with institutional and social factors (balances of  class forces). This brings
the discussion back to the arguments of  Smithian political economy.
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